Impact of Sahel Conflicts on the Mining Industry

Background: conflict and instability in the Sahel

The Sahel region—stretching across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger—has experienced coups, weak governance and rapidly growing jihadist insurgencies. The region’s core security problem lies in the Liptako-Gourma area where extremist groups linked to al-Qaeda (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) operate across porous borders. Terrorism has escalated dramatically; over 11,600 deaths were attributed to terrorism in 2023, and the Sahel accounted for more than half of global terrorism deaths in 2024. Military governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger turned away from Western security partners and invited the Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner), which has been implicated in civilian massacres. Recurrent coups (2021–2023) led to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which is less cooperative with regional bodies and the West, further complicating cross-border security.

Besides violence, illicit economies feed the conflict. A 2025 report on trafficking networks notes that gold smuggling and natural-resource exploitation are the main sources of income for armed groups; artisanal sites such as Boungou and Nampala generate millions of dollars in unregulated gold, sold through informal hubs in Togo, Ghana and Dubai. Criminal networks tax cattle rustling, arms transit and kidnappings, turning the Sahel’s war economy into a semi-regulated system that supplants state authority. Illicit financing sustains insurgencies, undermines legal supply chains and exposes mining companies to kidnapping, extortion and smuggling risks.

Importance of mining in the Sahel economies

Mining is one of the few formal sectors in these land-locked economies. In Burkina Faso and Mali, gold dominates exports; in Niger, uranium was historically the largest foreign-exchange earner. Mining contributes 10–15 % of GDP across these countries, provides revenue for governments and supports thousands of artisanal miners. The sector also attracts international investors because the region hosts several critical minerals:

• Gold – the Sahel has become Africa’s third-largest gold province. Mali is the continent’s fourth-largest producer, and Burkina Faso surpassed 90 t in 2025. Niger has modest gold output. 

• Uranium – Niger holds about 454,000 t of uranium reserves, representing ≈5 % of world supply. The country’s single industrial mine (Somaïr) accounted for 15–20 % of national exports before operations stopped in 2024. 

• Lithium – Mali’s Goulamina deposit is among the world’s largest hard-rock projects, with 890,000 t of lithium reserves. It is expected to make Mali Africa’s second-largest lithium producer by 2026. 

• Manganese and other base metals – Burkina Faso’s Tambao deposit contains a large manganese resource; base-metal exploration is ongoing but remains small compared with gold and uranium. 

Effects of the conflict on mining

Political interference and nationalisation

Military governments have reshaped mining to finance state budgets and reduce Western influence. In Burkina Faso, the junta nationalised two Canadian-owned mines, causing gold output to drop from 67 t in 2021 to 47.7 t by late 2024. The government has threatened to cancel more contracts and is raising its stake in new mines: Kiaka’s state share is slated to increase from 15 % to 50 %. Mali revised its mining code in 2023/24 to allow the state a 35 % stake (10 % free and 25 % purchased) and expects to collect US$1.2 billion from mining companies in 1Q 2025. It also nationalised the Yatela gold mine and seized stockpiles from Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto complex before settling the dispute for US$253 million. Niger revoked French company Orano’s Imouraren permit and approached Russia’s Rosatom to take over uranium mining.

Operational disruptions and production decline

Security threats, blockades and policy disputes have reduced output:

• Mali – Industrial gold production fell 23 % in 2024 to 51 t after the government seized Barrick’s gold stockpile and detained employees. Including artisanal mining, Mali expected only 58.7 t of gold in 2024. With negotiations concluded, Barrick forecasts 260–290 k oz (≈8.1–9 t) from Loulo-Gounkoto in 2026, down from 2024 levels. B2Gold’s Fekola mine produced 220,166 oz in the first half of 2025 and aims for 515 k oz in 2025, but it faces higher taxes under the new code. 

• Burkina Faso – Gold production dropped to 61 t in 2024, yet regulation, formalisation of artisanal sites and state oversight lifted output to 70.43 t by September 2025, and a record 94 t in 2025. Major mines, such as Sanbrado and Kiaka operated by West African Resources, contributed 300,383 oz (≈9.3 t) in 2025. However, armed groups regularly target gold convoys, and formal operations must pay higher royalties and surrender larger state stakes. 

• Niger – Due to coup-related sanctions and border closures, the Somair uranium mine exported no uranium in 2024, and Orano halted production from 31 October 2024. Uranium normally accounts for 15–20 % of national exports. The Global Atomic Dasa project is expected to start producing in 2026. 

Supply-chain threats and illicit activities

Armed groups fund themselves by exploiting natural resources and taxing transport. According to a 2025 analysis, gold smuggling and natural-resource exploitation are the primary income sources for insurgents. Trafficking hubs across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso act as “armed economic capitals,” where criminal networks, local elites and parts of the state profit from illicit exports. Violence has become tied to commerce; ransoms in central Mali average US$5,000–20,000 per victim, while ransoms for engineers or foreign officials can exceed US$200,000. Mining companies therefore face kidnap risks, extortion and the threat of their product being stolen or smuggled.

Mineral production, companies and competition

The table below lists key minerals, production figures and major companies operating in the Sahel. (Production volumes refer to 2024-2025 unless stated.)

Gold

Other minerals

Burkina Faso’s Tambao deposit is one of the world’s richest manganese deposits but remains underdeveloped due to conflict and logistical challenges. Phosphate and iron-ore prospects exist in Mali and Niger but have not yet attracted major investment.

Risk factors affecting mining investments

Investing in Sahelian mining is not for the risk-averse. Key risks include:

1. Security threats & kidnapping – Armed groups and criminal networks attack mining convoys, kidnap workers and steal gold. Gold smuggling, cattle rustling and kidnapping finance insurgents. Ransoms can exceed US$200,000 per foreign engineer. The concentration of terrorism in the region (over 11,600 deaths in 2023) raises the likelihood of attacks on remote mine sites and transport routes. 

2. Political instability & nationalisation – Military juntas have rewritten mining codes, nationalised assets and increased state stakes (Mali up to 35 %, Burkina Faso targeting 50 % in Kiaka). Unexpected tax hikes, contract reviews and export bans create regulatory uncertainty. Niger’s revocation of Orano’s permit demonstrates the potential for expropriation. 

3. Logistical challenges – Landlocked geography and border closures hamper exports. Niger’s uranium exports ceased in 2024 due to sanctions. Supply-chain disruptions raise costs; Resolute reported that supply-chain challenges in Mali affected operations. 

4. Illicit economies & corruption – Trafficking networks blur lines between insurgents, local elites and state actors. Companies risk complicity in smuggling if they lack robust traceability and due diligence. The informal sector also diverts gold away from official channels, reducing state revenues and intensifying government scrutiny. 

5. Climate & community risks – The Sahel is vulnerable to climate change; artisanal miners often suffer from floods and droughts. Environmental concerns about mercury pollution and deforestation have led to calls for stricter regulation. 

6. Financial & commodity-price volatility – Gold and uranium prices fluctuate, impacting profitability. Countries heavily dependent on these minerals face external-financing shocks. 

Company strategies and investment plans

Despite turbulence, companies continue to invest, albeit cautiously.

• Barrick Gold – Resolved its dispute with the Malian government by agreeing to pay US$253 million; the government returned seized gold and control of the Loulo-Gounkoto complex. Barrick’s 2026 guidance forecasts 260–290 k oz from Loulo-Gounkoto and 2.9–3.25 M oz company-wide. Barrick plans to invest in exploration and maintain community programs but remains wary of further policy changes. 

B2Gold – The Fekola complex will anchor the company’s growth; 2026 guidance calls for 820–970 k oz of gold production, with cash operating costs of US$1,155–1,280/oz and all-in sustaining costs (AISC) US$2,400–2,580/oz. B2Gold emphasises financial flexibility (cash US$380 million at end-2025) and intends to invest US$73 million in exploration. However, it must accommodate Mali’s 35 % state stake and potential security incidents. 

• Resolute Mining – Produced 277,236 oz in 2025 and generated EBITDA of US$383 million. Its 2026 guidance is 250–275 k oz of gold with AISC US$2,000–2,200/oz and capital expenditure US$310–360 million (including $170–190 million for the Doropo project in Côte d’Ivoire). Resolute is investing in sulphide expansion at Syama and the Doropo development; it expects to lift production above 500 k oz by 2028. 

• West African Resources (WAF) – Aims to become a +500 k oz per year producer. Its 10-year plan averages 533 k oz per year, peaking at 596 k oz in 2030. It is expanding the Sanbrado underground and developing the Toega and MV3 deposits. The Kiaka mine, ramping up since mid-2025, averages 277 k oz per year. WAF plans >100,000 m of drilling in 2026 to convert inferred resources. Risk arises from the Burkina government’s decision to raise its stake in Kiaka (additional 25 % for US$175 million), which will dilute WAF’s ownership and cash flow. 

• IAMGOLD – Essakane’s production fell in H1 2025 (181 k oz) due to lower grades, but the company guided 340–380 k oz for 2026. IAMGOLD’s 2025 company-wide production was 765,900 oz. It plans to hold 15 % of Essakane for Burkina, invest in sustaining capex US$165 million and keep AISC at US$2,000–2,150/oz. 

• Goulamina (Ganfeng/Leo Lithium) – Construction commenced in 2024; first exports of lithium spodumene are expected in 2025. The Malian government’s 35 % stake (10 % free + 25 % paid) underlines the high risk of resource nationalism. 

• Orano/Global Atomic – Orano halted uranium production due to insecurity and lack of export routes. Global Atomic is investing in the Dasa project, targeting startup in 2026 but faces sanctions and potential expropriation. 

Investment outlook

The Sahel offers world-class mineral deposits but remains one of the highest-risk mining jurisdictions. Key considerations for investors include:

1. Security costs – Companies must budget for private security, fortified transport and evacuation plans. Partnerships with host governments and community programs can help manage local grievances but cannot eliminate insurgent threats. 

2. Contract stability – The rapid rewriting of mining codes and nationalisation show that legal certainty is limited. Investors should structure agreements with stabilisation clauses and international arbitration options. 

3. Due diligence and traceability – Given the prevalence of smuggling, companies should implement robust traceability (e.g., blockchain tagging of gold) and verify supply chains to avoid reputational and sanctions risks. 

4. Local partnerships – Collaborating with local shareholders (including state entities) and training a local workforce (WAF reports 95 % Burkinabe workforce at Sanbrado) can build resilience and social licence. 

5. Diversification – Many producers hedge Sahel risk by investing in projects outside the region (e.g., Barrick’s global portfolio, B2Gold’s new Goose project in Canada, IAMGOLD’s Côté Gold in Canada). Investors should similarly avoid over-exposure.